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CHOICE OF AVOIDANCE LAW IN
GLOBAL INSOLVENCIES
Jay Lawrence Westbrook*
I. INTRODUCTION
This Article is about one important aspect of transnational
bankruptcy, the avoidance of prebankruptcy transactions. When
a multinational1 enters bankruptcy proceedings in its home
country, it will nearly always have engaged in prebankrutpcy
transactions having substantial contacts with two or more na-
tions. Every other party to each of those transactions may be a
defendant in an avoidance action 2 brought by the Trustee in
Bankruptcy (TIB) in an "avoiding" court, which is a court in a
nation that is not the home country of the multinational, but
which has substantial contacts with the transaction and has ju-
risdiction over an avoidance defendant.3 The avoiding court
must choose which avoidance law to apply.4 This Article dis-
cusses the most common and simplest case in which the choices
are two: (1) local (avoiding court) law; or (2) home-country
(domiciliary) law.
The most important single variable in this choice of avoid-
ance law should be the identity of the "distributing" court,
which is the court that will determine the distribution of the
proceeds of a successful avoidance action. As a general rule, the
avoiding court should apply its own law if it will distribute the
proceeds, but should apply the home-country avoiding law if it
will turn over the proceeds to the hone country court for distri-
bution. Because the choice of the distributing court will depend
upon the system of international cooperation to which the avoid-
ing court is committed, an avoiding court in a "Grab Rule" or
* Visiting Professor, Harvard University 1991-92. Benno C. Schmidt Chair in Busi-
ness Law, The University of Texas at Austin. © Jay L. Westbrook 1991 ARR. Wherever
this paper persists in error, it is despite the the helpful comments on an earlier draft
that I received from Hans Baade, Douglas Laycock, and Russell Weintraub.
1. This Article is concerned only with the bankruptcies of multinational enterprises.
See infra note 16.
2. "Avoidance" of a transaction refers to: (1) a judicial order requiring the return of
certain property transferred by a debtor; (2) the canceling of certain obligations incurred
by a debtor; or (3) the award of a monetary judgment against the beneficiary of a trans-
action in the amount of the benefit received.
3. This Article does not consider transactions importantly involving three countries.
4. See infra note 11.
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Secondary Bankruptcy jurisdiction should usually apply its own
law, but an avoiding court in a jurisdiction embracing Modified
Universalism should generally apply home-country law.5 In both
instances the avoiding court should not apply some combination
of both laws; that is, it should not (1) avoid the transaction if
either one of the two laws would avoid; or (2) refuse to avoid
unless both laws would avoid. The avoiding court should follow
these general rules to the maximum extent feasible rather than
applying a case-by-case conflicts analysis based upon counting
contacts, governmental interests in the particular case, and
other such conflicts rules designed for nonbankruptcy disputes
between specific parties, because individual disputes do not im-
plicate the distributional and systemic variables inherent in
bankruptcy cases.
Although my own perspective on these matters is unreserv-
edly internationalist, one element in the analysis is the rejection
of the traditional incantation that all national avoidance laws
have in common the goal of equality of distribution.6 In fact,
inequality of distribution is the rule in virtually every national
bankruptcy system.1 Therefore, the correct statement is that
avoidance laws have as their function the protection and vindi-
cation of the priorities set by each national distribution scheme.
That is, avoidance laws have as their central purpose overriding
the results of individual creditor self-help in favor of politically
determined community priorities. This perspective has consider-
able implications within a national system, but its relevance here
is that good sense and good policy require linkage between the
national avoidance law to be applied and the national priority
system that will govern distribution of the avoidance proceeds.
In the present primitive state of transnational bankruptcy
law,8 relatively little attention has been given to the choice of
avoidance law. The discussion that follows attempts in a prelim-
inary way to describe the problem and to identify some impor-
tant aspects of its analysis. A fully realized theory of avoidance
in multinational bankruptcies will be a large undertaking and its
attempt without further litigation might be imprudent, so my
5. These types of cooperation rules are described infra in Section IV.
6. See infra Section Im(2)(B).
7. See infra Section IH(2)(B).
8. See Jay L. Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism in Global Insolvencies: Choice of
Law and Choice of Forum, 65 Am. BANKR. L.J. 457, 466 & n.30 (1991) [hereinafter West-
brook, Global Insolvencies].
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conclusions are tentative and suggestive at most.
This Article has four major subdivisions: (1) the general
pattern of avoidance laws in the principal domestic bankruptcy
regimes; (2) the pattern of distribution priorities in those re-
gimes; (3) the international system of bankruptcy cooperation
(or lack thereof); and (4) an exemplary analysis of the choice of
avoidance law problem in the bankruptcy of a multinational en-
terprise. The first section describes the sorts of avoidance laws
found in the leading commercial jurisdictions and the policies
underlying them. The second section provides a similar intro-
duction to the principal distribution (priority) schemes found in
commercial countries. It describes the great diversity of priority
schemes, but it also reveals common elements that may offer an
approach to greater cooperation or harmonization. The third
section presents the principal existing and proposed systems of
international cooperation in managing the general financial de-
fault of a multinational enterprise. Each system represents the
context in which choice of avoidance law must operate and the
context is indispensable to understanding the relevant policies.
This section also summarizes briefly the importance of interna-
tional cooperation in bankruptcy proceedings. The final section
offers some introductory ideas about the proper analysis of
choice of avoidance questions using as examples current mul-
tinational cases.
The discussion that follows is limited to specific sorts of
problems. The entire field of international insolvency is so un-
formed that the possible variations in facts and law are endless.
Coherent analysis requires considerable limitation of the ques-
tions to be discussed. In my view that theoretical constraint also
applies to practical problems of law reform in this area: the diffi-
culty of the problems suggests we should carve out important,
but manageable sectors for reform, leaving other issues for later
attention. This Article discusses only the bankruptcies of mul-
tinational enterprises9 of a commercial nature 0 which are legal,
9. That is, enterprises with assets or operations in more than one sovereign state.
10. Commercial enterprises run for a profit. Like all definitions, this definition could
be troublesome at the margins, but it is directly analogous to the limitation of interna-
tional conventions to "commercial contracts" or "commercial disputes," an approach
that has worked very well in practice. A notable example is the United Nations Conven-
tion on the Recognition is one area in which systemic considerations may require and
Enforcement of Arbitral Agreements and Awards, June 10, 1958, T.I.A.S. No. 6997; 330
U.N.T.S. 3, and its sibling, the Inter-American Convention on International Commercial
Arbitration, June 16, 1976, O.A.S.T.S. No. 42, reprinted in 14 I.L.M. 336 (1975), which
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not natural, persons." I will limit the discussion to liquidations,
ignoring reorganizations (rescues),' 2 and for the most part I will
not discuss security interests (liens or special property).13 I will
generally use United States terminology. The footnote provides
cross references to terminology commonly used in other
countries."4
apply only to arbitration of commercial disputes.
11. I am frankly puzzled that so many proposals for reform in this field purport to
include natural persons. See, e.g., Draft Convention on Bankruptcy, Winding-up, Ar-
rangements, Compositions and Similar Proceedings, June 1980, E.C. Bull. Supp. 2/82
[hereinafter EEC Draft Convention], reprinted in JAN DALHUISEN, 2 DALHUISEN ON IN-
TERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY AND BANKRUPTcY, App. B (1986) [hereinafter J. DALHUEN]. To
include natural persons is to implicate a number of the most fundamental social and
normative policies of each nation-state, because of questions like exemptions (property
to be kept by the individual safe from creditors), discharge, spousal rights, and criminal
penalties. A limitation to legal persons, all "entities" that are not human beings, elimi-
nates most of these issues and reduces the rest to more manageable proportions.
12. E.g. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174 (1991) (Chapter 11 reorganization under United
States law).
13. I realize that this last omission of liens or special property amounts to Hamlet
without Claudius from the perspective of unsecured, general creditors, but the addition
of that subject would have made this effort at least twice as long and indigestible at a
single sitting.
14. "Bankruptcy" describes any system for the management of general default; this
includes proceedings often called "insolvency" elsewhere. In the United States both per-
sonal (individual) and legal-person insolvencies are called "bankruptcy." I will follow
that usage, although my concern is entirely with the latter. "Liquidation" refers to any
proceeding by which a business is wound up, its assets collected and sold, and the pro-
ceeds distributed to creditors. "Reorganization" refers to proceedings like rescue or com-
position through which the company is taken under court control for the purpose of
attempting to save the business and continuing its operation, with or without a sale of
the business to a new owner. "Inception of the financial crisis" refers to a legally defined
moment, such that transactions taking place after that moment might be subject to
avoidance. For the usage of "avoidance," see supra note 2. "Creditors" generally means
all the potential claimants against a debtor whose interests receive attention in the rele-
vant bankruptcy system. Creditors may include employees, unions, stockholders, guaran-
tors, local communities threatened by closure, and others of whose interest local law
takes account. "Trustee in Bankruptcy" (TIB) refers to an official or officials appointed
to manage the bankrupt's affairs, a task often including gathering assets and selling
them, ruling on creditors' claims, and distributing proceeds to creditors as local law pros-
cribes. The more universal English terms for TIEB are liquidator or administrator. The
term "security interest" refers to a creditor's priority claim to the proceeds of specific
collateral and is approximately the same as a "special preference" or "charge" in other
systems. "Priority" refers to the right of a creditor without a security interest to be paid
in preference to other unsecured creditors, and is roughly the same as the terms "general
preference" creditor or "preferred" creditor used elsewhere. "Preference," on the other
hand, in United States usage means a voidable transaction that overfavors a particular
creditor, as for example the prepayment of an unsecured creditor shortly before bank-
ruptcy and at a time when the debtor was insolvent. 11 U.S.C. § 547 (1991). "Fraudulent
conveyance" means a transaction avoidable because: (1) it was in fraud of creditors; or
(2) it resulted in too little value to the debtor in comparison to the value given up by the
CHOICE OF AVOIDANCE
Because this discussion is about a choice of law problem, I
should declare my general views about such questions. I will
devote little attention to the traditional approach to such
problems, despite its continuing vitality in many, if not most,
jurisdictions around the world. Although I feel great deference
toward highly sophisticated systems of jurisprudence that still
include traditional choice of law doctrine, I believe that tradi-
tional approaches are simply unsuited to current realities. The
formal manipulation of rules that purport to make "territorial"
distinctions in multi-territorial transactions offers scant help in
analyzing conflicts questions arising from modern multinational
enterprise. 5 On the other hand, I often find myself in disagree-
ment with some modern United States conflicts scholars, at least
as to business problems, because they seem to give too little
weight to the "one-law" policies, like predictability and reduc-
tion of litigation,16 and to ignore the importance of an effective
scheme of regulation of multinational enterprise.17 In commer-
cial matters, which are the ones I know something about, I look
to a group of seven policy factors that represent my own distilla-
tion of the scholarly thought that has been devoted to choice of
law in the business context."8
Having said all of that, both traditionalists and modernists
could agree with the arguments made here, because of the very
specific problem discussed in this Article. I limit myself to trans-
debtor. 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1991).
15. See generally RUSSELL WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICTS OF LAW (3d
ed. 1986) [hereinafter WEmTRAUB]; ROBERT LEFLAR, LUTHER McDOUGAL, & ROBERT FE-
LIX, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW §§ 86-88 (1986) [hereinafter ROBERT LEFLAR, LUTHER MC-
DOUGAL, & ROBERT FELIx]; Jay L. Westbrook, Extraterritoriality, Conflicts of Laws, and
the Regulation of Transnational Business, 25 TEx INT'L L.J. 71 (1990) [hereinafter
Westbrook, Extraterritorial Regulation].
16. Westbrook, Extraterritorial Regulation, supra note 15 at 79-81.
17. Westbrook, Extraterritorial Regulation, supra note 15 at 84-86.
18. Westbrook, Extraterritorial Regulation, supra note 15 at 74-86. Much of the
difficulty potentially created for business planning and economic efficiency by modern
conflicts analysis is obviated, at least in the law journals, by the general acceptance of
party autonomy. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187; Weintraub,
supra note 15, at § 7.3C; ROBERT LEFLAR, LUTHER McDOUGAL, & ROBERT FELIX, supra
note 15, at § 147; Westbrook, Extraterritorial Regulation, supra note 15, at 80 n.29.
Party autonomy is of little value, however, in choice of avoidance law, because the es-
sence of avoidance law in every jurisdiction is vindication of the rights of strangers to the
contract (other claimants against the debtor) and the community's choices of distribu-
tion priorities. See infra Section Ill(2)(A). Obviously the parties cannot be left free to
choose the law governing the rights of others or altering a mandatory statutory scheme
of distribution. See, e.g., UCC § 1-105 (1989) (enforcing party autonomy in choice of law
except with regard to mandatory provisions and the rights of third parties).
1991]
BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. [Vol. XVII:3
actions with substantial contacts with more than one jurisdic-
tion, precisely those where even a territorialist will concede a
territorial rule is least helpful. My subject is bankruptcy, which
is a unique multiparty proceeding requiring a unique level of in-
ternational cooperation for the benefit of every claimant, so that
a modernist might be convinced that bankruptcy is one area in
which systemic considerations may require application of gen-
eral, rough-justice rules.
II. OVERVIEW OF AVOIDANCE RULES
All but the most formalistic of choice of law scholars want
to know something about the laws that might be chosen before
choosing one, so it is appropriate to summarize briefly (and ad-
mittedly to simplify and distort) the sorts of avoidance rules
found in various countries.'
Most countries seem to have rules that permit the avoid-
ance of transactions that take place after the inception of a
debtor's financial crisis.20 Fraud is the most common ground. It
19. The student is greatly indebted in such an effort to three sources in particular:
(1) the pioneering work of the International Business Bankruptcy Subcommittee of the
Business Bankruptcy Committee of the American Bar Association, International Loan
Workouts and Bankruptcy: Protecting Loans and Investments in Argentina, Brazil, Ca-
nada, Egypt, England, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands,
Switzerland and Venezuela, 1987 A.B.A. Sec. Pub. Corp., Banking and Business Law,
Division of Professional Education [hereinafter American Bar Association]; (2) R. GITLIN
& R. MEARS, INTERNATIONAL LOAN WORKOUTS AND BANKRUPTCIES (1989); and (3) the out-
standing seminar organized by Professor Ian Fletcher at Aberystwyth, Wales, in 1989,
Cross-Border Insolvency: Comparative Dimensions, in 12 UNITED KINGDOM COMPAIA-
=rv LAW SERmS (Fletcher ed. 1990) [hereinafter Fletcher]. Each resulted in the publica-
tion of extremely helpful summaries written by practitioners and scholars knowledgeable
about the bankruptcy laws of various nations. These summaries included brief descrip-
tions of avoidance laws. Of course, the standard reference remains 1 J. DALHUISEN, supra
note 11, at Part II, §§ 1.04[1], 1.08, 2.132.14-.16. There are also a number of very helpful
individual articles, some of which are referred to in this Article.
These sources collectively do not purport to cover most of the world. It goes without
saying that this Article does not. On the other hand, it is probably fair to say that Euro-
pean domination of much of the world over a substantial period has resulted in bank-
ruptcy laws following one or another of the European models in most countries with
market economies and functioning commercial laws. The laws in a few countries also
reflect a United States influence. Thus the patterns discussed in these sources are typi-
cal, in a general way, of laws found in the great majority of countries outside what used
to be the Communist bloc.
20. For a remarkable overall discussion, see 1 J. DALHUISEN, supra note 11, at Part
H, § 1.04; Part III, § 2.05[1] n.30a; Part III, § 2.05[2] n.48a (some of this material is not
up to date, but the basic concepts remain valid). See generally American Bar Associa-
tion, supra note 19, at 54-55 (Argentina), 118-19 (Brazil), 191-93 (Canada), 271-73
(Egypt), 331 (England), 416-17 (France), 460-62 (Germany), 555-60 (Israel), 604-05 (It-
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is fair to say that the great majority of jurisdictions permit
avoidance of transactions that involve actual fraud against credi-
tors. Most also permit avoidance in at least some circumstances
where the transaction yielded the debtor substantially less value
than the debtor gave in the transaction (in the felicitous British
phrase, "transactions at an undervalue" 21), especially if the
debtor was, or was rendered, insolvent or unable to pay its
debts. The two types of actions are together embraced within
the concept of fraudulent conveyance in the United States, 22
while in systems based on European models they would be
found under the heading actio Pauliana.3 There are, of course,
a number of important variations in the definitions of fraud, in-
solvency, and inadequate value, as well as in various procedural
points like burden of proof.
Many countries go beyond avoiding fraudulent conveyances
to avoidance of transactions that in the United States are called
"preferential." That is, they permit avoidance of transfers and
other transactions that benefited certain creditors to the
prejudice of creditors generally. Payment of unsecured debt is
the leading example. In some countries (including until recently
the United States), this sort of avoidance is available only in
bankruptcy.24
As to both types of avoidance actions, there are national dif-
ferences with respect to defenses. The most important category
of difference is the extent and nature of the defenses of good
faith and lack of knowledge. These defenses are more or less eas-
ily established depending on the deference paid in a particular
aly), 778-79 (the Netherlands), 830-32 (Switzerland), 883-84 (Venezuela); Fletcher, supra
note 19, at 52-53 (Australia). Virtually all permit avoidance of transactions that take
place after an insolvency or bankruptcy proceeding has been opened and any necessary
public notification given. See 1 J. DALHUISEN, supra note 11, at Part III, 2.0511] n.28.
Jurisdictions that require publication may consequently resist applying avoidance law
against a transaction executed prior to publication in the state of the transaction. See,
e.g., Michael Bogdan, Report for Sweden, in 12 UNITED KINGDOM COMPARATIVE LAW SE-
RIuS at 113 (Fletcher ed. 1990) [hereinafter Bogdan]; 1 J. DALHUIsEN, supra note 11, at
Part II, 1.02[5], 1.04[4] (Germany and the Netherlands).
21. Insolvency Act, 1986, § 238 (Eng.).
22. 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1991); UNIFORM FRAUDULENT TRANSFER AcT §§ 4(a), 5(a) (1984).
23. See Case C-115/88, Reichart v. Dresdner Bank, A.G., E.C.R. (Fifth Chamber)
(Jan. 10, 1990); see generally 1 J. DALHUISEN, supra note 11, at Part III, § 2.05[1] n.30.
24. There was no generally available nonbankruptcy preference action in the United
States until the recent promulgation of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. UNIFORM
FRAUDULENT TRANSFER AT § 5(b) (1984). Some countries permit "preference" avoidance
only where the debtor paid an unmatured unsecured debt (that is, prepaid). 1 J.
DALHUISEN, supra note 11, at Part II, 1.04[4] (France and the Netherlands).
1991]
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avoidance regime to the risk of commercial disruption and un-
certainty as a result of avoidance actions. There is necessarily a
tension between the desirability of preventing fraud and pre-
serving assets for fair collective distribution, on the one hand,
and on the other the risk of uncertainty (and outrage) created
by the voiding of transactions that would be unexceptionable
absent insolvency and the imminence of default. The avoidance
systems in various countries can be characterized by a greater
concern with the values protected by avoidance or with the val-
ues of commercial certainty.2 5 Virtually all systems distinguish
for this purpose between the initial transferee (in United States
parlance)2 and subsequent transferees from the initial trans-
feree. The subsequent transferees are given broad protection
nearly everywhere, especially if they gave value without knowl-
edge, often leaving the liquidator with only a damage action
against the initial transferee.27
The defenses available in some systems focus on the
debtor's good faith or lack of intent to prefer,28 while others are
primarily concerned with the knowledge and good faith of the
transferee.29 Even where a transaction is avoided, most systems
provide some protection for value actually given30 and reinstate
the claim of a preferred creditor that has been forced to disgorge
a payment.3 '
Virtually all systems place time limits on avoidance actions,
some of remarkable complexity.3 2 The main categories are two,
the systems that establish a fixed period, often dated back from
25. See 1 J. DALHUISEN, supra note 11, at Part III, § 2.05[1] n.30.
26. 11 U.S.C. § 550(a) (1991). "The party to the transaction" is the English term
approximately equivalent to the "initial transferee" in United States law. Insolvency Act,
1986, § 241(2) (Eng.).
27. See 1 J. DALHUISEN, supra note 11, at Part III, § 2.0511] n.30. See, e.g., Insol-
vency Act, 1986, § 241 (Eng.); American Bar Association, supra note 19, at 192 (Canada).
28. E.g., Insolvency Act, 1986, § 238(5) (Eng.) (debtor's good faith); id. at § 239(5)
(debtor's intent to prefer). See Roy GOODE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE INSOLVENCY LAW
151 (1990) [hereinafter Roy GOODE]; see also American Bar Association, supra note 19,
at 560 (Israel).
29. See, e.g., American Bar Association, supra note 19, at 831 (Switzerland); see
generally 1 J. DALHUISEN, supra note 11, at Part III, § 2.051] n.30.
30. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 548(c), 550(d)(1) (1991); 1 J. DALHUISEN, supra note 11, at
Part I, § 3.07[2] (Germany).
31. United States law is curiously silent about the revival of the claim, although it is
generally assumed. Jay L. Westbrook, A Functional Analysis of Executory Contracts, 74
MINN. L. REv. 227, 272 n.200 (1989).
32. See, e.g., HARRY RAJAK, CoMPANY LIQUIDATIONS 280, .285 (1988) [hereinafter
HARRY RAJAK] (England); American Bar Association, supra note 19, at 604-05 (Italy).
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the opening of the bankruptcy proceeding,33 and those that leave
the fixing of the period to the courts.3 4 United States law is a
simple example of the first type, limiting avoidance of fraudu-
lent conveyances to one year prior to the bankruptcy petition
and most preference avoidance to ninety days.35 Where the law
is of the second type, the courts generally determine as a matter
of fact the moment prior to bankruptcy at which the debtor
ceased to pay (or ceased to be able to pay) its debts, the "cessa-
tion of payments." The period from that time to the opening of
the bankruptcy is the "suspect period" within which transac-
tions are most often open to avoidance.3 6 There is generally a
maximum period prior to the bankruptcy behind which the
court may not go.37 The period of avoidance necessarily varies
from case to case under the second approach and even among
the fixed-period countries there is great variation in the periods
chosen.3
In summary, most bankruptcy systems make provision for
the avoidance of transactions that took place during a certain
period prior to the opening of a bankruptcy proceeding. Despite
great variations among systems, it can be said that most permit
such avoidance in certain cases of fraud on creditors, transac-
tions at an undervalue, and transactions overfavoring certain
creditors. In most cases an action can be brought by the liquida-
tor against the initial transferee or party to the transaction for
return of the transferred property or for damages. Perhaps the
greatest diversity is found in the nature and extent of a good
faith defense by the beneficiary of the transaction being
attacked.
33. E.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 547(b)(4), 548(a) (1991); American Bar Association, supra note
21, at 191 (Canada), 830-31 (Switzerland); HARRY RAJAK, supra note 32, at 280, 285
(England). See generally 1 J. DALHUISEN, supra note 11, at Part III, § 2.0511] n.30.
34. See American Bar Association, supra note 19, at 54-55 (Argentina), 271 (Egypt),
416 (France), 460-61 (Germany), 883 (Venezuela); see generally 1 J. DALHUISEN, supra
note 11, at Part I, § 2.0511] n.30.
35. 11 U.S.C. §§ 548(a), 547(b)(4) (1991). A number of systems are hybrid, having
both fixed periods and a "suspect period." See, e.g., American Bar Association, supra
note 19, at 557-60'(Israel), 604-05 (Italy).
36. See supra note 34.
37. See, e.g., American Bar Association, supra note 19, at 54-55 (Argentina), 416
(France), 883 (Venezuela); see generally 1 J. DALHUISEN, supra note 11, at Part III,§
2.0511] n.30.
38. See supra note 32.
1991]
BROOKLYN J. INT L.
III. DISTRIBUTION SCHEMES
A. The Relationship Between Avoidance and Distribution
The policies affecting choice of avoidance law are intimately
related to those underlying the systems of distribution of bank-
ruptcy estates, because the result of avoidance is distribution of
the proceeds of avoidance under some scheme of statutory pri-
orities. Avoidance laws have the purpose and effect of re-order-
ing the distribution of a debtor's assets, erasing the results of
debtor and creditor actions in favor of the collective priorities
established by the distribution statute.
It is always said that all, or virtually all, domestic bank-
ruptcy systems share the common principle of equality of distri-
bution,39 which is therefore the common goal of avoidance
laws.40 I am one who has said that4 and it is true in a certain
sense. But it is importantly not true. All of us who proclaim the
universality of the equality principle know very well - and gen-
erally concede in the next breath - that in virtually every coun-
try the bankruptcy distribution system creates all sorts of priori-
ties for a variety of beneficiaries. "All creditors are equal, but
some are more equal than others."'42 A neutral observer, having
recently arrived from another solar system, might express polite
astonishment at the notion that the nations' systems of bank-
39. See H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 177-78 (1977) (equality of distribu-
tion is most important reason for preference rules). See also Kurt Nadelman, Legal
Treatment of Foreign and Domestic Creditors, 11 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 696, 697
(1946); Robert Weisbert, Commercial Morality, the Merchant Character, and the His-
tory of the Voidable Preference, 39 STAN. L. REV. 3 (1986); Charles Seligson, Preferences
under the Bankruptcy Act, 15 VAND. L. REV. 115 (1961) ("equity is equality" is corner-
stone of bankruptcy); John Lowell, Conflict of Laws As Applied to Assignments for
Creditors, 1 HARv. L. REV. 259 (1888) [hereinafterr Lowell]. See generally 1 J.
DALHUI EN, supra note 11, at Part II, § 1.0113].
40. In the United States, avoidance laws, especially the preference rules, have an-
other purpose that in my view is even more important than protection of the statutory
priorities. They are designed to lower the incentives to dismember a financially dis-
tressed debtor and to encourage out of court workouts to keep the debtor business going.
See Jay L. Westbrook, Two Thoughts About Insider Preferences, - MINN. L. REV.
-, at n. - (forthcoming) (1991). A knowledgeable creditor is aware that repossessed
collateral or levied property may have to be returned if the debtor files bankruptcy. On
the other hand, the creditor knows that it can more safely work with a troubled debtor
because noncooperating creditors will face a preference action if they seize property from
the debtor (or force payment) and bankruptcy follows. But this policy, which is conver-
gent with the strong U.S. commitment to reorganization once bankruptcy is filed, is not
commonly cited in support of avoidance rules in other countries.
41. See Westbrook, Global Insolvencies, supra note 8, at 466 n.30.
42. Cf. GEORGE ORWELL, ANimAL FARM (1946).
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ruptcy distribution represent a commitment to equality of
distribution.
It is fair to say something considerably more narrow about
bankruptcy distribution systems: virtually all such systems are
committed to equality of distribution among creditors who be-
long to a class of creditors given equal priority treatment. Fortu-
nately, that statement is not quite a tautology. It is not the same
as saying that a creditor should be treated equally unless it is
not. Instead, it is saying that creditors will be treated equally
within classes of creditors, even though some classes are treated
much better than others. That amounts to saying merely that we
will apply objective criteria to categorize each claim and give it
such priority in distribution as local law provides for that cate-
gory. That is a good legal principle, and it is especially impor-
tant internationally when linked with national treatment for for-
eign creditors, but it is considerably short of a commitment to
equality of distribution to creditors.
When distribution systems are so understood, the accurate
generalization is that avoidance actions are protective of the le-
gally mandated system of distribution priorities in that bank-
ruptcy system.43 That is, the policy behind avoidance is to im-
pose collective, societal priorities in preference to the results of
individual, self-help results.41 So, for example, most societies be-
lieve employees of the enterprise should receive certain priorities
in default. The prebankruptcy value-seizing activities of more
sophisticated and aggressive creditors would frequently win out
over the interests of employees as defined and limited in the de-
fault distribution scheme. Avoidance actions recapture some of
the fruits of that self-help for the benefit of those given priori-
ties under the local statute, including employees.
Routinely in discussions of domestic bankruptcy systems
"equality of distribution" is invoked as the fundamental policy
43. One recent casebook speaks in these terms, but without drawing unconventional
conclusions. DOUGLAS BAIRD & THOMAS JACKSON, BANKRUPTCY LAW 423-24 (2d ed. 1990).
One of its authors sees the preference rules as protecting the hypothetical "bargain"
struck among creditors. Thomas Jackson, Avoiding Powers in Bankruptcy, 36 STAN. L.
REV. 725, 758-59 (1984) [herinafter Jackson, Powers]. See also C. Robert Morris, Bank-
ruptcy Law Reform: Preferences, Secret Liens, and Floating Liens, 54 MINN. L. REV.
737, 738 (1970).
44. But see Jackson, Powers, supra note 43, at 758-59 (arguing that priorities are or
should be determined by a hypothetical "creditors' bargain."). Of course, a creditors-
bargain system of priorities would represent a political, societal choice to regulate a mar-
ket by enforcing purely private market decisions, giving them the coercive force of law.
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of bankruptcy law, but in fact the avoidance laws, and other
"equality" policies, are designed to protect statutory priorities of
which the equality of general, unsecured creditors is usually the
last, often empty category. 45 It follows that to the extent nations
have common distribution policies, they have common goals for
avoidance laws; to the extent distribution priorities are different,
avoidance goals are different. For me, this realization does not
reduce the desirability of international cooperation, although it
makes the rhetoric more complicated.
If we add to this point the related fact that avoidance goals
in every country are balanced against competing values - espe-
cially certainty and minimal disruption in the marketplace -
then we can state the general proposition that avoidance laws
have common goals to the extent that they serve similar distri-
bution schemes and draw similar balances in weighing protec-
tion of the statutory priorities against the costs and risks of per-
mitting avoidance of normally acceptable transactions.
B. Overview of Distribution Schemes
Because the effect of a successful avoidance action by a liq-
uidator is to make an asset or its value available for distribution
according to a particular scheme of distribution priorities, we
have to work through to the distribution of the proceeds of the
avoidance action to understand fully the effects of a particular
avoidance regime. Therefore it is appropriate to consider, in a
summary way, the patterns of distribution found in various
countries. As with avoidance rules, the summary is necessarily
simplistic.
Distribution systems are even more diverse than avoidance
systems, but some generalizations are possible. At the highest
level, virtually all systems distinguish four types of claims: (1)
secured (special preference); (2) administration (against the es-
tate itself); (3) priority (general preference); and (4) general,
unsecured.
Secured claims are at once the highest and the most limited
in priority, because they are generally paid prior to all other
claims from the proceeds of the collateral, but they have no spe-
cial priority as to the proceeds of other assets. 4" Nations vary
45. See infra note 74.
46. See generally American Bar Association, supra note 19; see 1 J. DALHUISEN,
supra note 11, at Part II, § 1.06.
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greatly in the extent to which law and culture permits broad,
"blanket" security interests, but the special priority of a valid
lien seems to be universally recognized.47
Administration claims, the expenses of the bankruptcy pro-
ceeding itself, generally enjoy a very high priority, for obvious
practical reasons."' This fact gives great comfort to the universal
order of lawyers, although even administration claims are some-
times trumped.49
Aside from secured and administration claims, priority sys-
tems are bewildering in their variety, reflecting various cultural
and political preferences.5 0 Nonetheless, it can be said that the
great majority of systems give high priority to the claims of em-
ployees and of public entities, especially revenue authorities.51
No other categories of claimants come even close to these in the
near universality of their favored status.
There is very little empirical evidence available about the
actual operation of bankruptcy systems anywhere. There is not
much in the literature about their practical results even on an
anecdotal basis. But what evidence we have suggests that in
most bankruptcies around the world relatively little is left for
distribution to anyone after the payment of secured, administra-
tion, and priority claims.52 The consequence is that it is fair to
say that the effect of avoidance of transactions in the average
liquidation is almost entirely to increase distributions to priority
creditors, especially employees and government authorities.
On the other hand, it is plausible that this general proposi-
47. One caveat is that systems based on English Law may give higher rank to cer-
tain general priority (general preference) claims even as to collateral proceeds where the
lien is a "floating charge." See, e.g., Roy GOODE, supra note 28, at 76.
48. See, e.g., American Bar Association, supra note 19, at 41 (Argentina), 187 (Ca-
nada), 264 (Egypt), 325 (England), 457 (Germany), 740 (Mexico), 776 (the Netherlands),
822 (Switzerland), 680 (Japan). See 1 J. DALHUISEN, supra note 11, at Part II, § 1.0612].
49. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 507(b) ("super priority" for certain secured claims),
364(c)(1) ("super-super priority" for certain postpetition financing) (1991).
50. See 1 J. DALHUISEN, supra note 11, at Part H, § 1.0611]. See generally American
Bar Association, supra note 19.
51. See, e.g., American Bar Association, supra note 19, at 41-44 (Argentina), 115
(Brazil), 263 (Egypt), 325 (England), 408-09 (the Netherlands), 822 (Switzerland); John
D. Honsberger, The Canadian Experience, in 12 UNITED KINGDOM COMPARATIVE LAW
SERIES 27, 32 (Fletcher ed. 1990) [hereinafter Honsberger]; R.W. Harmer, Report for
Australia, in 12 UNITED KINGDOM COMPARATIVE LAW SERIES 42, 48-49 (Fletcher ed. 1990)
[hereinafter Harmer]; Ulrich Drobnig, Report for Germany, in 12 UNITED KINGDOM COM-
PARATrE LAW SERIES 95, 101 (Fletcher ed. 1990) [hereinafter Drobnig]; see generally 1 J.
DALHUISEN, supra note 11, at Part II, § 1.06.
52. See infra note 74.
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tion does not apply to the largest cases and therefore may not
apply to the bulk of transnational cases. Experience suggests
that large companies may often be successful in avoiding encum-
bering most of their assets with liens, at least prior to the onset.
of the financial crisis. Because many international cases involve
large enterprises, there may be sufficient unencumbered prop-
erty in such cases that priority creditors can be paid with a sig-
nificant surplus for other claimants. Even where many of the
debtor's assets have been encumbered, the liens may have been
granted after the inception of the financial crisis. In those sys-
tems that permit avoidance of liens acquired for pre-existing
debt after the inception of the crisis (or during a fixed period
that usually includes that moment), avoidance of postcrisis liens
may yield substantial recoveries. Thus it is plausible that distri-
butions to nonpriority claimants in transnational cases may
fairly often be importantly affected by the availability of avoid-
ance actions.
The actual effects of avoidance will be of great importance
to policymakers (and should be to scholars) in fashioning or
agreeing upon choice of law rules for avoidance in transnational
bankruptcies. Two points appear most crucial: (1) we need more
evidence of all kinds (ideally empirical) about the actual results
of liquidations in various countries; and (2) we should address
the conceptual and policy problems of employee and governmen-
tal priorities as the key area necessary to international agree-
ment about international bankruptcy, especially avoidance
actions.
IV. CHOICE-OF-FORUM: THREE CURRENT NOTIONS OF TRANSNA-
TIONAL BANKRUPTCY
The most important determinant of the distributional result
of an avoidance action in a transnational insolvency case is the
type of international system to which the avoiding court is com-
mitted. That system will guide the avoiding court in its choice of
the "distributing court," the court that will distribute the pro-
ceeds of avoidance. Because bankruptcy courts always apply the
priority system of the lex fori,53 the choice of distribution forum
53. There is at least one remarkable exception to this proposition. Re Sefel Geo-
physical, Ltd., 54 D.L.R.4th 117 (Can. 1985). In that case, the Canadian court treated
avoidance proceeds from the United States as a trust fund to be distributed according to
United States priorities. The decision represents a very interesting and creative ap-
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represents the choice of the priority system of that forum to
govern the distribution. Because that choice in turn depends
upon the system of international cooperation (or lack thereof) to
which the avoiding court is committed, every question of choice
of avoidance law demands that we examine the avoiding court's
rule for choice of distribution forum in international cases.
At the present time one may speak of three conceptions of
the treatment of an international general default: (1) territorial-
ity; (2) universality; and (3) what I will call "limited coopera-
tion. '5 4 The first two lie at opposite ends of a continuum
stretching from a multitude of unconnected, country-by-country
proceedings (territoriality), where distributions would always be
local, to the broadest attempt to administer the debtor's affairs
cooperatively under a single legal regime (universality),55 where
all distributions would be controlled by a single court. The third,
limited cooperation, is a term to describe various approaches
that lie somewhere between territoriality and universality.
A. Territoriality
Territoriality may fairly be characterized as the "Grab
Rule." In the event of general default by a multinational legal
person, the courts in each national jurisdiction seize the prop-
erty physically within their control and distribute it according to
local rules. Although this approach is often defended as a way to
protect local creditors,56 most modern legal systems permit for-
eign creditors to share on a basis of equality in the local distri-
proach to international bankruptcy cooperation, but its solution has not been adopted
elsewhere, as far as I know. One author has made the interesting suggestion that pro-
ceeds in a Universalist system be distributed according to the country of origin of the
funds, making the Sefel approach a principle. See PHRI SMART, CRoss-BORDER INSOL-
VENCY, 207-08, 248 (1991) [hereinafter PHLIP SMART].
Most countries, including Canada, usually apply the lex fori in distribution. See,
e.g., Honsberger, supra note 51, at 33 (Canada); Drobnig, supra note 51, at 102 (Ger-
many); PHILIP SMART, supra, at 205 (England).
54. There are many discussions of these conceptions, using one terminology or an-
other. One standard description is found in 1 J. DALHUISEN, supra note 11, at Part III, §
2.03[3]. See also IAN FLETCHER, THE LAW OF INSOLVENCY 542-43 (1990) [hereinafter IAN
FLETCHER].
55. The phrase "unity of bankruptcy" is sometimes used to describe a principle sim-
ilar to universality. Although usage is not consistent, "unity" seems to refer more to
choice of forum, to a bankruptcy administered entirely in one forum, while "universal-
ity" refers to a single, universal legal regime. See, e.g., Drobnig, supra note 51, at 103-04;
PHInI SMART, supra note 53, at ix n.13.
56. See, e.g., Bogdan, supra note 20, at 114-15 (Sweden). See generally 1 J.
DALHUISEN, supra note 11, at Part III, § 2.03[3].
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bution under the principle of national treatment.57 In the mod-
ern world, sophisticated multinational creditors are increasingly
able to claim in local proceedings all over the world. Thus it is
fair to say that the primary effect of the Grab Rule is to protect
the primacy of local procedures and local law, with local credi-
tors and sophisticated multinationals sharing significant practi-
cal advantages as a result.
Most defenses of the territoriality rule have been conceptual
and formal rather than based upon commercial or other poli-
cies.58 In part its justification seems to be a sigh of despair:
bankruptcy is simply too complicated for international coopera-
tion to work.59 To the extent one can try to extract more satis-
factory policy support for the principle, one could argue that
territoriality serves three bankruptcy goals: (1) it is relatively
simple and therefore relatively cheap, always a strong argument
in insolvency matters; 0 (2) it protects creditors used to relying
on local law and procedures; and (3) it provides a rough-justice
allocation of assets among nations, because the location of assets
at the time of general default may fairly often reflect to some
extent the debtor's level of commercial activity in each country.
B. Universality
Universality in its ultimate realization would provide a sin-
gle forum applying a single legal regime to all aspects of a
debtor's affairs on a worldwide basis."1 Creditors throughout the
57. National treatment is provided in most commercially important countries, ex-
cept that foreign tax claims are almost never recognized. See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note
19, at 14 (England); Honsberger, supra note 51, at 31 (Canada); Harmer, supra note 51,
at 48 (Australia; not clear regarding tax); Drobnig, supra note 51, at 100 (Germany);
Bogdan, supra note 20, at 113-14 (Sweden; no mention of tax claims). See generally 1 J.
DALHUISEN, supra note 11, at Part II, § 1.0512]. See, e.g. Felixstowe Dock and Railway
Co. v. U.S. Lines, Ltd., [1987] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 76 (Dutch creditor using British protective
procedures). There are countries where national treatment is not granted. See, e.g.,
American Bar Association, supra note 19, at 29 (Argentina). The share awarded to for-
eign creditors is often subject to adjustment to reflect amounts they may have received
in other jurisdictions. See infra note 107.
58. See 1 J. DALHUISEN, supra note 11, at Part III, § 2.03[3] nn.40-45.
59. See 1 J. DALHUISEN, supra note 11, at Part III, § 2.03[3] nn. 48-49. Other leading
scholars are not in despair, but seem to have only modest hopes. See, e.g., IAN FLETCHER,
supra note 54, at 624-28.
60. See 1 J. DALHUISEN, supra note 11, at Part III, § 2.03[3] n.45.
61. See 1 J. DALHUISEN, supra note 11, at Part I, § 2.03[3] n.46 and accompanying
text; IAN FLETCHER, supra note 54, at 542-43; John D. Honsberger, Conflict of Laws and
the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 30 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 631, 633-34 (1980) [herein-
after Honsberger, Conflict].
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world would be paid under one system of priorities from the re-
alization of all the debtor's assets, wherever located. It is hard to
imagine the realization of that ideal short of establishment of a
supranational institution with that responsibility, so even the
most optimistic proponent of the universality idea cannot expect
its complete fulfillment in the foreseeable future. Therefore
universality has been commonly defined in terms of a primary
proceeding in a debtor's "home" or domiciliary country, with
"ancillary" proceedings in other jurisdictions where the presence
of assets or other matters require local assistance to the primary
court.62 It has been said that universality, even in this more real-
istic formulation, requires that one law, the lex fori, be applied
to all aspects of the debtor's affairs, 63 although I do not share
that view.6 4
Universality is a very appealing approach and has long been
accepted as the proper goal of international bankruptcy law by
leading writers.6 5 Its attraction is both formal and pragmatic. It
is intellectually elegant and it would increase overall recoveries
for everyone concerned with financially troubled companies.6 6 It
also invokes idealism and altruism as a system that would be
more fair and would better serve the public policy, broadly un-
derstood, of every concerned nation. 7 Nonetheless, universality
is as difficult to achieve as it is appealing and nothing close to a
universal regime exists anywhere except within a few small re-
gional treaty groups.6 8 It is fair to say that the Grab Rule is the
dominant doctrine in most countries, even those that have made
some effort toward international cooperation.
62. See 1 J. DALHUISEN, supra note 11, at Part III, § 2.03[3] nn.49-51; IAN FLETCHER,
supra note 54, at 546; Hans Hanish, Survey Over Some Laws on Cross-Border Effects of
Foreign Insolvency Procedures on the European Continent, in 12 UNITED KINGDOM
COMPARATrVE LAW SERIES 149, 159 (Fletcher ed. 1990) [hereinafter Hanish].
63. See 1 J. DALHUISEN, supra note 11, at Part III, § 2.03[3].
64. See Westbrook, Global Insolvencies, supra note 8, at 462-64.
65. See, e.g., Lowell, supra note 39, at 259.
66. See Westbrook, Global Insolvencies, supra note 8, at 465.
67. Westbrook, Global Insolvencies, supra note 8, at 465. See 1 J. DALHUISEN, supra
note 11, at Part III, § 2.03[3] nn.33-39. See also Westbrook, Extraterritorial Regulation,
supra note 15 (arguing that transnational regulation of emerging multinational enter-
prise is necessary in the larger public interest).
68. Convention Regarding Bankruptcy, Nov. 7, 1933, 155 L.N.T.S. 115 (Nordic
Convention).
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C. Limited Cooperation
There is almost unanimous agreement that more interna-
tional cooperation in insolvency matters is required and that the
Grab Rule in its pure form is undesirable. There is much less
agreement about the right course for reform.69 From the general
conviction that more cooperation is needed, there has emerged
some movement away from the Grab Rule toward limited coop-
eration. The court cases and legislation, enacted or proposed,
that make up this trend can be divided into two categories: (1)
secondary bankruptcies; and (2) modified universality.
The approach often called secondary bankruptcies seems to
command considerable European academic support.70 One of the
most sophisticated and elaborated proposals of this sort is the
Istanbul Convention, recently opened for signature by the Coun-
cil of Europe.7' The secondary bankruptcies approach is a modi-
fication of the Grab Rule in several respects, two of which are
most important. The first modification gives the home-country
liquidator easier and more complete access to the courts of coop-
erating countries and may permit the utilization of local proce-
dures to halt actions against the debtor, to collect the debtor's
local assets, and the like.72 The second key modification found in
the secondary bankruptcies approach is the possibility of turno-
ver to the home-country bankruptcy court of some of the
debtor's local assets, after a priority distribution is given to cer-
tain local creditors, such as secured (special preference) credi-
tors and priority (general preference) creditors.73 The result is to
give substantially more international effect to the home-country
bankruptcy than is currently the case in most countries and to
provide a universal distribution as to part of the debtor's assets,
viz. those available to general, unsecured creditors under the va-
rious local laws. On the other hand, the Grab Rule remains in
69. Two recent proposals are nearly polar extremes. MODEL INTERNATIONAL INSOL-
VENCY COOPERATION AcT, reprinted in 12 UNITED KINGDOM COMPARATIvE LAW SERIES at
287 App. (Fletcher ed. 1990) [hereinafter MODEL INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY COOPERA-
TION ACT]; European Convention on Certain International Aspects of Bankruptcy,
opened June 5, 1990, E.T.S. 136, art. 14 [hereinafter Istanbul Convention]. The first
commands complete deference to the home-country court by all other courts, while the
second provides only for recognition of the home-country liquidator and a limited
amount of sharing of assets.
70. See, e.g., IAN FLETCHER, supra note 54, at 624; Hanish, supra note 61, at 158.
71. See Istanbul Convention, supra note 69.
72. Istanbul Convention, supra note 69, at ch. H.
73. Istanbul Convention, supra note 69, at arts. 18-19.
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place as to secured and priority (preferential) creditors. Because
it appears that throughout the world there is little left in most
bankruptcy estates after those creditors have been fully satis-
fied,74 there might be little change in distributions as a result of
this approach, although there may be an increase in assets sub-
ject to some collective sharing if it is true that international
cases often involve less secured debt.
The other branch of limited cooperation can be called modi-
fied universalism. It accepts the central premise of universalism,
that assets should be collected and distributed on a worldwide
basis, but reserves to local courts discretion to evaluate the fair-
ness of the home-country procedures and to protect the interests
of local creditors. The leading example is section 304 of the
United States Bankruptcy Code,75 but various current proposals
for legislation 6 and recent court cases7 7 may also be put in this
74. See, e.g., Patricia Ghozland, Preferential Claims in Cross-Border Insolvency
(Oct. 19, 1988) (paper, British Inst. Int. and Comp. Law, Seminar on Cross-Border Insol-
vency, copy on file with author) (effect on ordinary creditors of preferential claims in
French liquidations); Michael Herbert & Domenic Pacitti, Down and Out in Richmond,
Virginia: The Distribution of Assets in Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Proceedings Closed in
1984-1987, 22 UNIv. RICH. L. REV. 303 (1988) (little left in United States business or
consumer bankruptcies after paying secured and priority creditors). See generally 1 J.
DALHUISEN, supra note 11, at Part H, 1.01[2], 1.01[3].
75. 11 U.S.C. §§ 304-306 (1991). United States usage often refers only to section 304
as a sort of shorthand, but in fact the deference procedures are found in sections 304-
306. The best recent survey of section 304 litigation is found in Douglass Boshkoff,
United States Judicial Assistance in Cross-Border Insolvencies, 36 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q.
729 (1987) [hereinafter Boshkoff]. Another excellent discussion of section 304 is found in
Honsberger, Conflict, supra note 61, at 659-75. Recent section 304 cases are discussed by
the dean of American international bankruptcy scholars in Stefan Riesenfeld, Transna-
tional Bankruptcies in the Late Eighties: A Tale of Evolution and Atavism, in COMPAR-
ATIVE AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 409 (David Clark ed., 1990) [hereinafter
Riesenfeld].
76. See MODEL INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY CORPORATION AcT, supra note 69. The
Bilateral Treaty approach proposed by Mr. Peter Totty, a prominent London insolvency
practitioner, is akin to modified universalism, although it depends upon bilateral treaties
between cooperating nations. Dimensions, supra note 12, at 280. It is properly included
in the category of modified universalism because it gives broad and direct effect to an
insolvency in a foreign jurisdiction which has a treaty relationship with the cooperating
country.
77. In the United States: See, e.g., In re Axona Int'l Credit & Commerce, Ltd., 88
B.R. 597 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988), aff'd 115 B.R. 442 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990), appeal dis-
missed 924 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1991); In re Gercke, 122 B.R. 621 (Bankr. D. D.C. 1991). See
generally cases discussed in Boshkoff, supra note 75.
In France: Kleber v. Friis Hansen, Cass. civ. ire (1986), J.C.P. II, No. 20776, with
annotation by Judge Remery, J.C.P. II, No. 14969. In Germany: P.N. KG u.a. v. RA 0,
95 BGHZ 256 (1985). Both the French and German cases gave a measure of extraterrito-
rial effect to a foreign bankruptcy. The first made the foreign adjudication effective to
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category. Modified universalism can be best understood as a
weak or tentative version of universalism, just as the secondary
bankruptcies approach is a somewhat internationalized version
of the Grab Rule.
The section 304 procedure in the United States reflects the
two sides of modified universalism. It serves universalism by
providing specific procedures for international cooperation and
deference to the home-country court. The court may protect lo-
cal assets with injunctions and may ultimately turn over those
assets for distribution in the foreign proceeding.78 On the other
hand, section 304(c) provides a whole list of excuses for refusing
cooperation and enormous discretion to defer or refuse deference
is vested in the trial court.79
Although this paper is not the appropriate place to expand
upon the arguments for increased international cooperation, ar-
guments that have been made elsewhere,"' the analysis requires
a brief summary of some crucial points. The central fact is that
international cooperation will materially change results for par-
ticular creditors in every case. The inevitable consequence is
that local claimants will be prejudiced in some cases. Interna-
tional cooperation will be achieved despite local prejudice only if
policymakers are convinced of two things: (1) that over a run of
cases local prejudice in some cases will be balanced by local
gains in others; and (2) that a cooperative system will greatly
benefit all claimants by increasing distributions in bankruptcy
cases and by lowering transaction costs in international credit
transactions. Those two propositions in turn depend upon a sys-
tem that promises an adequate level of (1) reciprocity; and (2)
predictability. These points are crucial because they form the
policy framework for examining choice of avoidance law in re-
gimes that are committed to some level of international
invalidate an attachment lien obtained subsequent to the foreign adjudication but prior
to any action by the foreign liquidator in France, a major advance from prior French law.
The second case overruled years of German law in giving effect to a Belgian bankruptcy
for the purpose of entitling the Belgian liquidator to claim (and sue for) a debt in Ger-
many. See Riesenfeld, supra note 75.
78. 11 U.S.C. § 304 (1991).
79. See In re Axona, 924 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1991) (appeals court expresses concern
about nonreviewability of bankruptcy court decision under sections 304 and 305).
80. See, e.g., Westbrook, Global Insolvencies, supra note 8; Stefan Riesenfeld, The
Status of Foreign Administrators of Insolvent Estate: A Comparative View, 24 Am. J.
CoMP. L. 288 (1976).
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cooperation."'
V. ANALYSIS
Having sketched the systems of avoidance, distribution, and
international management, I may turn to the principal subject,
choice of avoidance law. The literature contains very few reports
of cases in which a court has made an international choice of law
in an avoidance action.8 2 I want here to offer a first-level, illus-
trative analysis using a fairly typical factual pattern drawn from
recent United States cases.
It is not surprising that we find a lack of precedent for
choice of avoidance law, given the paucity of statutes and cases
addressing international insolvency conflicts in general. One rea-
son for the lack of conflicts authority across the board is that the
Grab Rule reduces, although it does not eliminate, the need for
choice of law rules. To the extent that the Grab Rule turns on
81. For a discussion of each of the points, see Westbrook, Global Insolvencies, supra
note 8.
82. A recent report of Argentine law describes two instances in which the Argentine
court as home-country jurisdiction applied its own law to avoid a transaction local to
another country. Juan Dobson, The Law of Argentina, in UNITED KINGDOM COMPARATIVE
LAW SERIES 119, 137-40 (Fletcher ed. 1990). See generally Kurt Nadelmann, The Na-
tional Bankruptcy Act and the Conflict of Laws, 59 HARv. L. REV. 1025, 1051-56 (1946).
The Draft European Convention gives exclusive avoidance jurisdiction to the home-
country (principal place of business) court. See EEC Draft Convention, supra note 11, at
arts. 3, 15. However, it applies the whole law of the home-country (with some excep-
tions), which might in turn refer to another law, such as the lex situs. EEC Draft Con-
vention, supra note 11, at art. 18. See generally J. Lemontey, Report on the 1980 EEC
Draft Convention on Bankruptcy, Winding-up, Arrangements, Compositions, and Simi-
lar Proceedings, reprinted in 2 J. DALHUISEN, supra note 11, at B-56-57, B-84-86; D.
LASOK AND P. STONE, CoNFLIcT OF LAWS IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 405 (1987).
A recent French case gave effect to a Danish bankruptcy from its opening, but de-
clined to address the applicability in France of Danish prebankruptcy avoidance law.
Kleber v. Friis Hansen, Cass. civ. ire (1986) J.C.P. 11, No. 20776, with annotation by
Judge Remery, J.C.P. II, No. 14969. See supra note 77. In a few instances, Canadian
courts have applied United States avoidance law. Honsberger, supra note 51, at nn.40,
63-65. It is said that Germany will permit a foreign administrator in a foreign ancillary
bankruptcy to bring an avoidance action in Germany, but only as to assets in the admin-
istrator's jurisdiction. Drobnig, supra note 51, at 104. The view has also been expressed
that avoidance might require voidabiity under both German and foreign law, but that at
least one case in Germany has applied foreign law alone to void a transaction. Drobnig,
supra note 51, at 107.
Obviously jurisdictions that do not give any effect to the passage of title of property
to a bankruptcy estate by virtue of a foreign bankruptcy are not likely to apply the
foreign avoidance law. The refusal to recognize the proprietary effects of foreign bank-
ruptcies is the rule in a number of countries. See, e.g., Bogdan, supra note 20, at 115
(Sweden). Until recently, it was the rule in Germany. See supra note 77.
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the physical power to compel recovery of property or payment of
damages, the application of local rules to a transferee subject to
local jurisdiction seems obvious. Conversely, distant parties and
transactions are assumed to be beyond local bankruptcy juris-
diction, 3 even though many countries assert power over a local
debtor's property everywhere in the world. 4 On the other hand,
the theorists and reformers who would modify or replace the
Grab Rule have not often focused on choice -of law. Some of
them assume that selection of a single dominant forum under
the universalist regime means the lex fori applies to all issues in
the unified proceeding.8 5 Others have concentrated so intently
upon unification in a single forum that they have largely sub-
sumed or ignored choice of law issues.86 The main area in which
choice of law issues have been addressed is in the allowance of
claims.8 7
These factors have been especially effective in submerging
choice of law questions as to avoidance actions. In the prevailing
Grab Rule context, application of local law to a local transferee
83. See, e.g., Fotochrome, Inc. v. Copal Co., Ltd., 517 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1975) (stay
does not reach foreign arbitration). But see In re McLean Industries, Inc., 76 B.R. 291
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987) (enforcing automatic stay against foreign creditor for foreign col-
lection activities where creditor subject to jurisdiction because doing business in the
United States). English law seems to assume that the local court can apply local avoiding
powers ("relation back") to local transfers, but would not apply them to transfers of
property elsewhere. See PHILP SMART, supra note 53, at 51-52; but see id. at 119 (En-
glish court treated American assignment for creditors as fraudulent conveyance, in Re
Henry Hooman, 1 L.T.R. 46 (1859)).
84. The United States is one of many jurisdictions which asserts jurisdiction over
the property of a debtor "wherever located." See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (1991); Honsberger,
supra note 51, at 32 (Canada); Harmer, supra note 51, at 48 (Australia); Bogdan, supra
note 20, at 111 (Sweden; protesting contrary view expressed in some reports). See gener-
ally KURT NADELMANN, CODIFICATION OF CONFLICTS RULES FOR BANKRUPTCY 64-67 (1974),
reprinted in Hearings on H.R. 31, 32 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional
Rights, H.Reps. 31, 32, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. at 1457 (1976) [hereinafter KURT
NADELmANN]. It is repeatedly said that German law asserts worldwide jurisdiction if the
debtor is a German domiciliary. See, e.g., Drobnig, supra note 51, at 99. Yet the effect of
various German rules, especially the refusal to force an accounting for foreign recoveries,
seems to undercut that proposition substantially. See Kurt Nadelmann, Rehabilitating
International Bankruptcy Law: Lessons Taught by Herstatt and Co., 52 N.Y.U.L. REV.
1, 6 n.20 (1977). But see Hans Hanish, Crediting a Creditor with Proceeds Recovered
Abroad Out of the Debtor's Assets Situate Abroad in Domestic Insolvency Proceedings,
in 12 UNITED KINGDOM COMPARATIVE LAW SEIES 192, 195-96 (Change in German law
requiring for accounting for foreign recoveries).
85. See supra note 53.
86. See Westbrook, Global Insolvencies, supra note 8, at 461-64.
87. See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 19, at 14 (England; discussion of application of
the proper law of the contract to foreign claims); Bogdan, supra note 20, at 114 (Sweden;
same).
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may not appear problematic in many cases, while an avoidance
action against a nonlocal transferee would often be impossible.
An issue of choice of avoidance law is likely to arise only if: (1) a
transferee is subject to the jurisdiction of more than one country
where insolvency proceedings have been opened as to a given
debtor; or (2) a relevant country has a system of deference to
home-country bankruptcy proceedings.
For these reasons, it is not surprising that recent cases rais-
ing these issues have arisen in the United States, where the sec-
tion 304 deference procedure creates a context in which they be-
come visible and important. Because of the increasing
recognition everywhere of the need for a more internationalist
regime for multinational bankruptcies, a discussion of these
cases will provide a useful example of the problems that will
confront courts throughout the world in the coming years.
The leading case is In re Axona Int'l Credit & Commerce,
Ltd."' In Axona, a Hong Kong wholesale bank was the subject of
an insolvency proceeding in Hong Kong. The bank had substan-
tial assets and liabilities in the United States, primarily through
correspondent and credit relationships with United States
banks. When Axona's financial crisis transpired, the United
States banks, notably Chemical Bank (Chemical), took steps to
protect their interests, including the obtaining of collateral and
attachments against United States assets and the exercise of set-
off against United States accounts. Chemical's actions were
taken in close cooperation with Axona and involved both its
New York and Hong Kong branches in the transfers and
restructurings of the credit relationship. 9 The decisive setoff by
Chemical took place in New York.
A little over two months later, a creditor's proceeding was
brought against Axona in Hong Kong and liquidators were ap-
pointed. The creditors brought a full involuntary bankruptcy
proceeding against Axona in the United States. The proceeding
was not a section 304 "ancillary" action, but was the same sort
of general proceeding that would be brought against a debtor
domiciled in the United States. The United States Bankruptcy
88. 88 B.R. 597 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988), aff'd 115 B.R. 442 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990)
appeal dismissed, 924 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1991).
89. 88 B.R. at 599-600. The actions of these United States creditors were apparently
in conflict with an attempted cooperative liquidation in Hong Kong coordinated by a
committee of creditors that included other United States banks. See American Expresss
Int'l Banking Corp. v. Johnson, [1984] HKLR 372, 374.
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Code explicitly permits this sort of action by a foreign adminis-
trator or liquidator, giving the foreign representative a choice
between an "ancillary" proceeding and a full-blown United
States bankruptcy.90 The United States Trustee in Bankruptcy
then commenced preference-avoiding actions against the United
States banks. It appears that the facts were such that the chal-
lenged transactions were clearly avoidable preferences under
United States law. All these actions were settled, but Chemical's
settlement reserved its right to challenge the "jurisdiction" of
the bankruptcy court "to administer Axona's U.S. bankruptcy
case." 91 The TIB and the liquidators (Axona's representatives)
then applied to "suspend" the United States case and have the
recovered assets turned over to the liquidators for distribution
through the Hong Kong insolvency proceeding.
When the hearing for suspension and turnover was held,
Chemical opposed the application. Its opposition was based
upon its reserved right to challenge the court's jurisdiction. Its
central complaint was that Axona's representatives were unfairly
manipulating United States law by first using a full United
States proceeding to void transfers under United States bank-
ruptcy law and then turning over the proceeds to be distributed
under another law, especially where the transaction was cen-
tered outside the United States and the law of the debtor's dom-
icile (Hong Kong) would not have permitted avoidance."2 Ax-
ona's representatives responded that the United States statute
expressly permitted the result they sought.9 3 They also claimed
that the transactions in question would have been avoidable
under Hong Kong law as well.
The bankruptcy court granted the application for suspen-
sion and turnover. Its decision rested largely on the express
United States statutory provisions authorizing both the bringing
of the case and its suspension in favor of a home-country pro-
ceeding. But it also rejected Chemical's claim of unfairness in
the application of United States law to a transaction that Chem-
ical claimed took place in Hong Kong. The court noted the
90. 11 U.S.C. § 303(b)(4) (1991).
91. 88 B.R. at 602.
92. Id. at 603. Chemical also made a constitutional argument against bankruptcy
court jurisdiction. Id.
93. 11 U.S.C. §§ 303(b)(4) (power of foreign representative to bring full United
States proceeding), 305(a)(2) (suspension of United States proceeding in deference to
foreign proceeding) (191).
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United States contacts with the transaction and held that "...
Chemical must be presumed to have been on notice that it
would or could be subject to United States law applicable to its
conduct even when it is acting in the international context." '94 At
the same time, the court rejected Chemical's matching argument
that it was unfair to subject it to Hong Kong law in the distribu-
tion, citing Canadian S. Ry. v. Gebhard9 5 for the proposition
that Chemical was on notice of the applicability of the bank-
ruptcy laws of its debtor's domicile.
What must have been very frustrating to Chemical is that
the court never really addressed its central point: it was being
subjected to a bit of this law and a bit of that one, producing a
result that it argued would have been unavailable under either
law standing alone, an illegitimate "mix and match" of two dif-
ferent legal regimes. That sort of argument is fairly often made
in international conflicts cases and can be a very powerful one.
But the court's opinion never really treated the question
presented as a choice of law issue, except to say that Chemical
should have anticipated the possible application of either law.96
On the other hand, existing conflicts doctrine would not support
the view that "mix and match" is always illegitimate; d~pecage,
the application of different laws to different issues, is well
established.9
Axona is the state-of-the-art case in the United States and
perhaps in the world at the present time. Its facts and holding
will be useful points of reference in the discussion that follows.
Because of the procedural posture of the case, it is not possible
to draw from it a clear choice of law rule. But a reasonable read-
ing would be this: where a transaction has substantial contacts
with the United States and the home-country, it may be avoided
under United States avoidance law in favor of home-country dis-
tribution. Given that the court did not decide whether avoidance
was possible under Hong Kong law, the rule would appear to
apply whether or not the transaction is avoidable under the
home-country avoidance law. 8
94. 88 B.R. at 617.
95. 109 U.S. 527 (1883).
96. In fairness, Chemical seems to have presented the argument more in terms of
jurisdiction than conflicts of law.
97. See RUSSELL WEINTRAUB, supra note 15, at § 3.4A.
98. See also In re Pacat Finance Corp. 295 F. 394, 401-02 (S.D.N.Y. 1923); In re
Pollmann, 156 F. 221 (S.D.N.Y. 1907). In Pacat, a United States creditor levied on the
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A second United States rule can be derived from two re-
lated cases involving a German bankrupt. They suggest thatthe
foreign, home-country avoidance law may be applied by a
United States court to avoid a payment that was made in the
debtor's home-country, but received by a United States trans-
feree in the United States.9" In both cases the payments were
made in the home-country and received in the United States by
the United States creditor.
We can use these cases and the factual pattern they share to
work through an illustrative analysis of the choice of avoidance
law problem. 00 It will be instructive to do so first from the per-
spective of a Grab Rule jurisdiction and then as the problem
would be seen in a system committed to some form of modified
universalism. As in those cases, the analysis will assume at-
tempted avoidance of a payment or setoff made in favor of an
otherwise unsecured, general (unpreferred) creditor in an inter-
national transaction that has substantial contacts with both the
home-country and the local jurisdiction, but not with any third
country. It will also assume, as in those cases, that the avoidance
defendant-is a legal person and the relevant transaction was in
international commerce.
French bank account of a United States debtor. When the creditor claimed in the United
States home-country bankruptcy, the court set aside the levy as a preference under
United States law. Pollman can be read to permit application of United States law to
avoid as a preference a judicial lien obtained by a German creditor against German real
property owned by the United States debtor, but the case really involved the United
States "equalization" provision, or "hotchpot" notion, which, like similar provisions in
many countries, requires equalization in making distributions to creditors who have par-
tially satisfied their claims in foreign jurisdictions. See infra note 107.
99. In re A. Tarricone, Inc., 80 B.R. 21 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988) (dictum); In re
Metzeler, 78 B.R. 674 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987). Aside from their procedural holdings that
United States avoidance law can be asserted only in a full-blown United States bank-
ruptcy, both cases indicate that German law might be applicable to create a cause of
action against United States transferees of payments made in the United States by a
German debtor that subsequently entered bankruptcy in Germany. 80 B.R. at 24 (resolve
issue in litigation over representative's proof of claim); 78 B.R. at 677-78 (commence-
ment of section 304 ancillary proceeding in the United States within one year of the
German bankruptcy satisfied German avoidance-law requirement that action be brought
within a year of bankruptcy). In Metzeler it is clear that the payment was made in Ger-
many, although received in the United States, because it was made by wire transfer from
a German bank to the account of the United States transferee-creditor in a New York
bank. Id. at 675.
100. A review of current thinking should include recent European proposals for such
conflicts rules. See supra note 82. A recent study suggests that the English courts could
reach the Axona result under similar circumstances. See PHILIP SMART, supra note 53, at
52-53.
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These are the possible choice of avoidance law rules:
The transaction will be avoided if (1) it is only avoidable
under home-country law (that is, domiciliary law governs com-
pletely); (2) it is only avoidable under local law (that is, situs or
forum law governs completely);101 (3) case-specific choice of law
rules choose home-country or local law based on the contacts
and state interests presented in each case, and it is avoidable
under the law thus chosen; (4) it is avoidable under either home-
country or local law; or, (5) it is avoidable under both home-
country and local law (that is, it is unavoidable unless both laws
would avoid). 1°2
The "rule" that seems to be emerging from the recent
United States cases is the fourth: the transaction is avoidable if
either law would avoid it. Tarricone apparently rejects the sec-
ond and the fifth rules, and the silence in Axona about Hong
Kong law suggests rejection of the first and the fifth rules. It
would be plausible to extract from these cases the third rule, the
rule that the court will determine which law applies and avoid if
that law so requires, but the complete absence of choice of law
analysis in all three recent cases implies that the fourth rule is
the most correct reading.
None of the United States cases discuss the connection be-
tween choice of avoidance law and the priority system that will
determine the effects of avoidance, the distribution of the avoid-
ance proceeds. Yet the close connection between avoidance laws
and the priority systems they protect suggests that the choice of
avoidance laws and of distributing courts should ordinarily be
closely linked.
A. The Grab Rule Analysis
In a Grab Rule jurisdiction, it seems obvious that the sec-
ond rule should be applied. 03 The distribution of the proceeds
101. This second rule assumes application of internal law, without renvoi. See infra
note 128 and accompanying text.
102. Where the transaction has no contact with third countries and both home-
country and local law would avoid, it is hard to see a good reason to refuse avoidance. It
should be noted, however, that this entire discussion deliberately eschews nuance. For
example, both countries may avoid, but to different extents. In that case, the analysis
must proceed on the basis that one avoids and one does not, to the extent of that
difference.
103. To the extent that a Secondary Bankruptcy regime operates like a Grab Rule
system in producing an entirely local distribution the following analysis would apply to
such a system. To the extent a Secondary system would yield a home-country distribu-
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of avoidance will be according to local rules. The court is expert
in applying the local avoidance law and the usual expectations of
local parties would be satisfied by its application. The local bal-
ance between protection of statutory priorities and avoidance of
market disruption will be applied to the parties and the market
for which they were designed.
On the other hand, application of home-country law is in-
consistent with the premises of the Grab Rule. If home-country
law would avoid a transaction not avoidable under local law,
avoidance would not promote the home-country policies served
by its avoidance rule, because the proceeds of avoidance would
not be distributed according to the home-country priority sys-
tem. The purpose of the home-country avoidance law is to pro-
tect distribution according to home-country priorities, but the
proceeds of its application in a Grab Rule jurisdiction will made
under the local priorities.104 Conversely, where local law would
avoid and home-country law would not, application of local law
to avoid would be quite appropriate, because it would have its
intended effect of protecting the local claimants who are the
beneficiaries of the local priority system. Local avoidance de-
fendants could not complain when their own law was applied in
favor of their fellow local claimants, just as it would be in a do-
mestic case. Foreign avoidance defendants subjected to suit
under the local avoidance law would also have little basis for
complaint, because, on our assumptions, these foreign parties
were so maladroit as to obtain their advantages in transactions
with substantial local contacts, subjecting themselves to local
avoidance rules. For these reasons, it seems sensible and fair to
apply local avoidance rules where any recovery will be distrib-
uted according to local law.
An avoidance defendant might argue for a distinction be-
tion the later discussion of a universalist analysis would be more appropriate. One inter-
esting question is whether a Secondary Bankruptcy court should look to the actual dis-
tribution in the case before it or to the general results in that system. For the reasons
already discussed, it will generally be the case that a system of Secondary Bankruptcies
will result in a largely local distribution, so that a Grab Rule analysis is probably the
correct one.
104. The one potential home-country of whicl that is not true is the United States,
because its avoidance rules serve the antidismemberment policy as well. But that policy
is not often found in other countries. See supra note 40. While the United States could
apply its own law to vindicate the antidismemberment policy even when it was not the
debtor's home-country, it is not the sort of policy that can be easily advanced unilater-
ally where the home-country court does not share it.
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tween the avoidance law itself and the defenses to avoidance. It
might concede that local law should be applied to determine the
avoidability of the transaction at the first stage, but contend
that home-country defenses should be available to defeat avoid-
ance. Rules making transactions avoidable are designed to pro-
tect a distribution scheme, but avoidance defenses are meant to
protect a market from disruption. Therefore, if home-country
law would provide a defense to avoidance, avoidance under local
law would disserve the home-country's market protection policy.
In other words, the home-country does have an interest in ap-
plying its avoidance defenses. Although this argument would
have force in some contexts, we have limited our discussion to a
transaction with substantial contacts with both markets. 105 In
those circumstances, there is a true conflict in the interests of
the two countries, the home-country's interest in protecting its
market against disruption and the local interest in protecting its
distribution scheme. The local court may fairly prefer giving pri-
ority to protecting its own distribution system, especially in a
Grab Rule world.
It must be admitted that the pleasant symmetry of this
analysis, application of local law by the local court, is only ap-
parent, because of the serious disadvantages and anomalies of
the overall Grab Rule system. The supposed centrality of local
interests is eroded by the principle of national treatment, a prin-
ciple that is followed in most important commercial countries. 106
The consequence is that sophisticated international creditors
claiming in many local proceedings may do much better than the
local supplier who is the paradigm for the Grab Rule. 0 7 Another
105. See the assumptions listed in the text following note 100. Note that the as-
sumed transaction, which includes substantial contacts in both countries, is the common
one in which "situs" rules are largely useless because the situs of the transaction can be
plausibly assigned to either country.
106. See supra note 54.
107. The advantage accruing to sophisticated international creditors claiming in
multiple proceedings will be reduced by sharing or "hotchpot" rules. E.g., 11 U.S.C. §
508(a) (1991). See Fletcher, supra note 19, at 14 (U.K. hotchpot rule); Drobnig, supra
note 53, at 100 (Germany); Bogdan, supra note 20, at 113 (Sweden; should be Swedish
law). See generally 1 J. DALHUISEN, supra note 11, at Part II, § 1.05[2]. The advantage
will not be eliminated. Among other things, various national rules require an accounting
for some types of recoveries elsewhere, but not others. For example, the United States
rule is limited on its face to recoveries in "foreign proceedings," which are defined as
home-country proceedings in the nature of bankruptcy or reorganization proceedings. 11
U.S.C. §§ 101(23), 508(a) (1991). Thus equalization is not imposed if the creditor recov-
ered 1) in a third country bankruptcy; or 2) by individual actions, even in the home
country.
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defect of the application of local law under the Grab Rule is that
it gives the widest opportunity to creditors to manipulate trans-
actions so as to evade territorial rules. Choice of law clauses and
lightning transfers of funds may combine to put the pea under
the most legally congenial shell. That factor also works to the
benefit of the sophisticated multinationals. But the news is not
all good even for these sophisticated players, because of two
other problems with the Grab Rule. One is that application of
local law to legal persons that are suable in many jurisdictions
creates substantial risks of parallel litigation and double recov-
eries.10  Worst of all for international financers, the results are
manipulable without being truly predictable, maximizing trans-
action costs, especially legal charges, at each stage in the credit
process, from extension of credit to collection.
B. Analysis Under Modified Universalism
The analysis is very different in a court bound to a system
of modified universalism. In such a court, the proper rule for the
type of transaction we are considering" would be the first rule,
applying the home-country rule exclusively.110
One author suggests that the hotchpot approach may be the most sensible way to
cooperate internationally, if courts will forward distributions to other courts to balance
overall dividends, although that suggestion may reflect the very broad English commit-
ment to the hotchpot principle. See PHIMIP SMART, supra note 53, at 118, 151, 174-79,
193. The English courts have sometimes maintained equality of distribution by enjoining
creditors from foreign collection efforts. Id. at 184-85.
The United States has a further twist on the equalization principle, in the form of a
provision requring the surrender of a preference as a condition to payment of a creditor's
claim. 11 U.S.C. § 502(d) (1991). Historically this provision was used primarily against
domestic creditors, because of the old limitations on federal bankruptcy jurisdiction. See
Jay Westbrook, The Coming Encounter: International Arbitration and Bankruptcy, 67
MINN. L. Rav. 595, 611 (1983). Today its importance is almost entirely international.
108. See, generally Baade, An Overview of Transnational Parallel Litigation: Rec-
ommended Strategies, 1 Rav. LITIGATION 191 (1981).
109. See the assumptions in the text following note 100.
110. One of the recent United States cases implied in dictum that only United
States avoidance law could be applied in a full-blown United States bankruptcy. In re A.
Tarricone, Inc., 80 B.R. 21, 23 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988) (dictum). The court stated the
converse of this proposition, that a German bankruptcy court would never apply United
States law, even to a transaction like the one in that case with substantial United States
contacts. Because the court made no reference to German law in that respect, it implied
that bankruptcy courts would always apply local law, lex fori, to avoid transactions, even
those with substantial foreign contacts. No authority was cited for this dictum and there
is no a priori reason it should be true. That is, there is no general principle that prevents
a bankruptcy court in any country from choosing a foreign law as applicable to avoidance
of a transaction, just as it might choose foreign law for any other purpose. See supra
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The most fundamental reason is that the avoiding court will
ordinarily turn over the avoidance recovery to the home-country
court, which will distribute the recovery in accordance with
home-country priorities. The appropriate avoidance law will
therefore be the law of the distributing, home-country court. In
addition, applying home-country avoidance law will best serve
the overall goals of the universalist approach.
I advanced earlier the notion that adoption of modified uni-
versalism depends ultimately on a conviction that the overall re-
sults of a cooperation system of transnational bankruptcy will
more than offset any prejudice to local interests in a particular
case."" That premise depends in turn on the adoption of a coop-
eration regime that yields high predictability of results and reci-
procity.112 No rule so well accomplishes those goals as nearly ex-
clusive application of home-country avoidance law."13
Although circumstances will exist in which determination of
the home-country of a corporation will be difficult," 4 it will usu-
ally be self-evident. If every creditor knows in advance that the
debtor's home-country avoidance rules will be applied to all
prebankruptcy transactions, the costs and risks of credit exten-
sion under various circumstances will be far more predictable
than they are today. For example, the extent and timing of per-
missible setoffs will be known, so that the benefits of requiring
maintenance of balances in lending banks can be calculated. The
costs and benefits of obtaining security can be better predicted
as well, in part because the degree of protection provided to the
note 82. On the other hand, similar views have been expressed as to other jurisdictions.
See, e.g., Harmer, supra note 53, at 53 (Australia).
111. See supra text following note 80.
112. See supra text following note 80.
113. I say "nearly" exclusive because some matters will remain undeniably local for
the indefinite future, the ultimate example being rights in real property (immoveables).
Yet even there a recent decision of the European Court of Justice under the EC judg-
ments convention held that an actio Pauliana (there a fraudulent conveyance, in United
States terms) affecting title to real estate should be treated for jurisdictional purposes as
a personal action to be brought at the defendant's domicile, rather than as an in rem
proceeding to be brought at the situs of the real estate. Case C-115/88 Reichart v. Dres-
dner Bank A.G., E.C.R. (Fifth Chamber) (Jan. 10, 1990). Nonetheless, rights in real es-
tate and security interests in personal property will be among the last interests to be
subject to a central, home-country conflicts rule.
114. See IAN FLETCHER, supra note 54, at 621 n.16. See also Lynn LoPucki & Wil-
liam Whitford, Venue Choice and Forum Shopping in the Bankruptcy Reorganization
of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 1991 Wisc. L. REV. 11, 17-19 (discussing venue-
manipulation of "principal place of business" in reorganization cases within the United
States).
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unsecured creditors body can be assessed. Even more obviously,
creditors will be better situated to evaluate the competing risks
presented by a proposed restructuring of a troubled debtor,
knowing the extent to which self-help by noncooperating credi-
tors will be curable through a bankruptcy filing.
Such a cooperative regime would have the further advan-
tage of serving the distributional policies of one highly inter-
ested state in each case, as opposed to the present situation
where the ultimate worldwide distribution is frequently inconsis-
tent with the policies, including the common policies, of all in-
terested states. For example, the effect of chaos in the manage-
ment of multinational default may be to permit sophisticated
creditors to evade all avoidance rules and seize all of the value of
a company, leaving employees in many countries without the
benefit of their statutory priorities. 15
If local laws are applied to avoidance questions under a sys-
tem of modified universalism, most of these benefits will be lost.
Avoidance results will depend upon the location of assets at a
future time, which in turn will be a function of chance and of
possible manipulations by the debtor and various creditors. The
sheer number of variables, together with the complete unpre-
dictability of many of them, will mean that creditors will be un-
able to evaluate accurately the costs and risks of the creation or
restructuring of credit arrangements. These difficulties will re-
sult not only from exclusive application of local law under the
second rule above, but also from concurrent application of local
avoidance law under either the fourth or fifth rules above. The
third rule, sporadic application of local law on some case-by-case
conflicts approach, would be even more devastating, wrecking
predictability and making reciprocity almost impossible to eval-
uate. Its effect on predictibility is obvious. The prejudice to reci-
procity is less obvious, but just as important. Reciprocity is best
served by transparency of law, making it easy for foreign courts
to see that local courts have indeed applied an international
principle evenhandedly. Any system of counting contacts or
weighing interests in each case will make the choice of law un-
predictable and opaque.
With these points in mind, we can reconsider Axona. Be-
115. Cf. Brittain v. United States Lines, Inc. (In re McLean Industries, Inc.), 884
F.2d 1566 (2d Cir. 1989) (In bankruptcy of United States domiciliary debtor, Singapore
law, place of ship arrest, applied to defeat claims of injured seamen under United States
law).
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cause the United States is committed by section 304 to a modi-
fied universalism, it follows that Axona's application of United
States law to the Chemical payments was not consistent with
the long-term goals of section 304. It served the key short-term
objective of section 304, because it vividly demonstrated and re-
affirmed the United States commitment to international cooper-
ation. But application of United States law for the benefit of a
Hong Kong distribution does not contribute to the long-term de-
velopment of a set of rules that make sense in a system of modi-
fied universalism. 116 Only an exclusive home-country rule serves
that purpose.
Applying local law has disadvantages beyond its bad sys-
temic fit. Either the fourth or fifth rule may result in serious
prejudice to local creditors and that prejudice may create irresis-
tible pressures for relaxing local avoidance laws or abandoning
international bankruptcy cooperation. Taking the fourth rule
above, if, as may have been true in Axona, United States law is
applied to avoid even if Hong Kong law would not avoid, the
United States parties, the avoidance defendants, have suffered
serious losses and United States claimants may realize little or
nothing from the enhanced Hong Kong distribution. It may be
that United States claimants will get nothing, because of distri-
bution priorities favoring certain claimants, especially Hong
Kong employees and public authorities. Even if there is a distri-
bution to nonpriority United States claimants, the net return to
United States claimants as a group will always be smaller be-
cause of an avoidance in the United States.117 There might be a
116. In Axona, application of Hong Kong law would likely have produced the same
result as to the attachments obtained in the United States. The Hong Kong court in
Axona noted that the attachments would have been ineffective in the liquidation under
Hong Kong law because of the traditional English rule that attachments are not enforce-
able in insolvency unless they have been completed. American Express Int'l Banking
Corp. v. Johnson, [1984] HKLR 372, 381. The situation is less clear as to the transfer
and setoff involving Chemical, discussed earlier, because the Hong Kong court did not
address that point and the United States opinion is not very clear about the facts or the
specific aspects of that transaction that were attacked by the United States TIB.
117. For example, if there is a general distribution, the body of creditors in
nonhome country A, where there has been a preference recovery against a local creditor,
will always get less than if there had been no avoidance, unless virtually all the creditors
of the debtor are in A, a most unlikely event. If the reader will forgive a formula: (X/N)L
> (X+Y/N+Y)(L+Y)-Y.
Where X=preavoidance general funds; N=preavoidance claims; L=Aggregate local
claims held by persons other than the preference defendant; Y=Amount recovered by
avoidance, which is also the amount of postavoidance claim by the preference defendant.
The left side of the inequality is the preavoidance net return to local claimants as a
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gain from the redistributive effects of avoidance for some United
States claimants, but the amount gained per claimant will usu-
ally be small.118 That benefit is not only small, but is apt to be
obscured politically by the serious anomalies attendant on ap-
plying local law where home-country law would not avoid. For
example, on the Axona facts it is possible that a Hong Kong
bank that was preferred in exactly the same way as Chemical
will not only deep its preference (unavoidable, we are assuming,
under Hong Kong law), but will collect part of Chemical's pay-
ments as a further distribution against its claim. Local (United
States) creditors contemplating that distribution will grow testy.
These sorts of results may produce enormous pressure in
the United States toward one of two bad consequences: (1) elim-
ination of the section 304 experiment; or (2) watering down
United States avoidance law, generally or as applied to interna-
tional transactions, so as to "level the playing field" between
United States lenders and others. Every country applying the
fourth rule will feel the same pressures, because local creditors
will similarly "suffer" if local law avoids when home-country law
would not.
In countries that remain committed to international cooper-
ation in bankruptcy, the result will be competitive pressure to
"deregulate," by weakening local avoidance laws. I say "deregu-
late," because avoidance laws regulate nonbankruptcy self-help
in favor of societally determined priority systems. 119 The pres-
sure to deregulate 304 weakening avoidance laws would be yet
another instance of territorial rules operating to preclude social
group and the right side is the postavoidance local net. It holds true for all values except
X=L, the highly unlikely event that all general claims in the home-country proceeding
are made by local creditors. The avoidance amount will always equal the postpetition
claim of the avoidance defendants in a preference action, which the inequality assumes
rearises after avoidance. In a fraudulent conveyance action, the avoidance amount Y
would generally be net of a postavoidance claim (for example, a claim for improvements
under 11 U.S.C. § 550(d) (1991)), there would be no postavoidance claim, and the
formula would be modified.
118. If the preference recovery equals 10% of the preavoidance assets; and the pre-
avoidance dividend is 10% to general creditors, the dividend to the other United States
claimants after a preference avoidance in the United States would increase by 10%. For
example, using the terms defined in note 117 supra, where X = US$100K, N = US$1
million, and Y = US$10K, and LC = U.S. $25,000, LCP - the preavoidance dividend
on LC and LCA = the LC dividend after avoidance, LCP (X/N)LC = $2,500; LCA
(X Y/N Y)LC = U.S. $2,750.00. US$250 would be the increased dividend, 10% higher
than preavoidance).
119. See supra Section mI(A).
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regulation of transnational business, 120 a result many of us
would deplore.' 2 ' In effect, a national Grab Rule would be re-
placed by a Grab Rule in favor of sophisticated international
creditors essentially freed from the avoidance policies found in
virtually every country.
The second effect, pressure to denature local avoidance law,
would also result if the fifth rule were adopted, the rule denying
avoidance unless both laws would avoid. Because local claimants
would almost always receive less than local avoidance defend-
ants would lose when a local creditor suffered avoidance, 22 each
country would benefit from having the weakest possible avoid-
ance rule, even in a system of modified universalism. 123 A weak
local avoidance rule would protect local avoidance defendants in
bankruptcies domiciled elsewhere. On the other hand, a strong
avoidance rule would be of little use when the court is the home-
country court against creditors not subject to its jurisdiction, be-
cause the local courts have jurisdiction of those creditors will not
avoid under the fifth rule, unless both laws would avoid.
The fifth rule has a deregulatory effect even prior to the ef-
fect of pressure to water down local avoidance laws. First, it is
subject to manipulation because of its territorial (local law) com-
ponent, just as with the Grab Rule system, and therefore sophis-
ticated creditors will often be able to evade the regulatory effect
of avoidance laws. Beyond that, the simple fact of an increase in
the number of elements to be satisfied will reduce the number of
successful avoidance actions. If each avoidance law has eight ele-
ments (including defenses), only two of which are common, then
the combined requirement has fourteen elements and there is a
much better chance the avoidance defendant can prevail on one
of them. Again the effect will be to reduce the regulatory impact
of avoidance rules in each jurisdiction.
This first-level analysis, although it admittedly ignores a
number of important problems and variables, tends to demon-
strate that application of United States avoidance law - exclu-
120. See Westbrook, Extraterritorial Regulation, supra note 15, at 85, 93.
121. See Westbrook, Extraterritorial Regulation, supra note 15, at 85, 93.
122. See supra notes 117-18.
123. This would be true under option the fifth rule (avoid only if both countries
laws would avoid) even in those cases in which a given country was the home country,
because a broader local rule extracts only from local creditors, while other "ancillary"
jurisdictions will extract nothing from their locals unless their domestic rule also permits
avoidance.
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sively, concurrently, or sporadically - is a mistake in cases like
the three recent United States cases mentioned above where the
United States is acting "ancillary" to the home-country court.124
In summary, the reasons are (1) because the purpose and effect
of avoidance laws are to promote distribution under a particular
priority scheme, there is a policy discontinuity, and resulting
anomalies and injustices, in applying the avoidance law of one
jurisdiction when the proceeds of avoidance will be distributed
in another; (2) the system of modified universalism upon which
home-country distribution is premised is far better served by a
rule that applies home-country avoidance law only, because that
rule maximizes predictability and discernible reciprocity, the
two biggest payoffs for a system of modified universalism. 12
There are, of course, a number of difficulties with a rule
that applies only home-country avoidance law, even in a, system
of modified universalism. I have identified five. One of the diffi-
culties has been ignored because of the narrowing assumptions
made earlier. This analysis has excluded cases involving small
creditors engaged in purely local transactions. There would be
real difficulty in applying Hong Kong preference law to a small
United States supplier who was dealing with a local branch of a
Hong Kong debtor in a transaction that was in every way local
except for the nationality of the debtor. On the other hand, the
great majority of cases in which large amounts are apt to be dis-
puted in international cases are within the limiting assumptions
made above. These are the cases that are likely to come before
the courts, in the United States and elsewhere.
A second difficulty in applying a home-country avoidance
rule exclusively will exist in all cases: such an approach will
sometimes require the local courts to understand and apply a
very difficult and technical area of foreign law. That is a strong
objection. But the force of this objection is greatly weakened by
the fact that it will apply only sometimes. Where the avoidance
defendant is subject to the jurisdiction of the home-country
124. This statement does not necessarily apply where there has been no bankruptcy
proceeding opened in the home country. Although it will be the rare case when it is both
legally possible and justified to open a bankruptcy proceeding in the United States when
the debtor continues to operate elsewhere as before, such a case may often properly be
treated as a local matter, applying local law.
125. One might be able to manufacture a system which applied local law in a way
reasonably consistent with modified universalism, but the resulting doctrine would be
very complex and could not serve as well as an exclusive home-country rule.
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court, the United States will be able to dismiss or stay in defer-
ence to resolution of the issue by a court well-familiar with the
applicable law.'26 Furthermore, the courts have already begun to
develop devices by which they can communicate in international
insolvency matters, so that the United States court may well be
able to get judicial advice and help in applying home-country
law even where the avoidance defendant is not subject to home-
country jurisdiction.12
Another major question revealed by this first-level analysis
is whether the ancillary court in a system of modified universal-
ism should look to the whole law of the home-country or only to
its internal avoidance law. 128 On the face of it, the court should
look to the whole law of the home-country, including its choice
of avoidance law rule. Suppose that in a case like Axona Hong
Kong internal law would avoid, but United States law would
not, and that the Hong Kong conflicts rule would apply United
States law. If the United States court avoided under Hong Kong
avoidance law, the United States creditors would suffer an
avoidance recovery when it would not have been liable in the
Hong Kong court and when no similarly situated creditor (say, a
British bank) would have been liable even if the other creditor
126. One obvious and now commonplace solution is forum non conveniens dismis-
sals conditioned on the defendant's agreement to adjudication on a fair basis in the for-
eign court. E.g., In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India, 809 F.2d
195 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 484 U.S. 871 (1987) (dismissal subject to defendant's agree-
ment regarding, inter alia, discovery and Indian jurisdiction); cf. Remington-Rand Corp.
v. Business Systems, Inc., 830 F.2d 1260 (3d Cir. 1987) (United States court defers to
Dutch bankruptcy court conditioned on results under Dutch law). For a discussion of
similar "conditional deferrals," see Pmui SMART, supra note 53, at 239 n.15. For a dis-
cussion of forum non conveniens in bankruptcy, see generally, id., Chapter 2. On a re-
lated point, some English cases have resulted in a sharing between liquidators in differ-
ent countries. Id. at 214.
127. See, e.g., Felixstowe Dock and Railway Co. v. U.S. Lines, Ltd., [1987] 2 Lloyd's
Rep. 76 (United States Bankruptcy Court "order" amounting to a short treatise on
United States Chapter 11 reorganization for the benefit of the United Kingdom court).
128. In general, renvoi, application of the whole law of another state, has no place in
interest analysis in its pure form. But the analysis offered here is significantly different
from pure interest analysis. It is not my concern in this paper to place its tentative,
pragmatic bankruptcy conflicts analysis in the overall conceptual debate about conflicts,
but it would be fair to say that the analysis offered here is only derivative of interest
analysis, with much more emphasis on systemic, international interests than is generally
found in interest analysis. These systemic interests are the common, shared concerns of
nations about the functioning of a system of international bankruptcy cooperation. They
represent the sort of systemic concerns that are at the heart of the traditional territorial
approach, although that approach is often incapable of vindicating them. See generally
Westbrook, Extraterritorial Regulation, supra note 15, at 79-82, 91-92.
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was subject to Hong Kong jurisdiction. That result seems too
one-sided to be tolerated.
On the other hand, looking to the whole law of Hong Kong
has its own pitfalls. If Hong Kong would apply its own avoid-
ance law, then so should the United States court. If Hong Kong
would apply United States law12 and United States law would
avoid, then the United States court would have to avoid under
United States law in order to reach the same result that Hong
Kong would reach if the United States avoidance defendant
were subject to Hong Kong jurisdiction. But it would be doing so
under a rationale - application of home-country law in the ser-
vice of modified universalism - that is defeated by the applica-
tion of local (United States) law for all the reasons just dis-
cussed. Under those circumstances, there is a strong argument
for not applying United States law to avoid, taking the position
that United States courts will avoid only when the home-coun-
try would avoid under its own law. Further support for that po-
sition comes from the fact that it will help to protect United
States avoidance defendants during the period of transition
from a territorial, Grab Rule world (reflected in the hypothe-
sized "situs" oriented conflicts rule in Hong Kong) and the de-
velopment of a general system of international cooperation.
The fourth major problem raised by using an exclusive
home-country rule is that its rationale does not apply unless the
United States court is ultimately going to turn over the proceeds
of avoidance to the foreign court or distribute in accordance
with a worldwide distribution under the guidance of that court.
In the minority of cases where United States courts refuse to
defer to the home-country court under section 304, they will be
applying a Grab Rule approach to the United States assets and
therefore should arguably apply local avoidance law for the rea-
sons discussed under that heading. That result - and the conse-
quent loss of predictability and other unfortunate consequences
of the Grab Rule - seems inevitable in any system that does
not automatically defer to the home-country court.
The fifth problem in using a home-country rule is the pres-
sure to de-regulate to attract multinationals. United States com-
panies might move headquarters off-shore to enjoy the advan-
129. It appears that Hong Kong might do so. At least in the Axona case in Hong
Kong it was held that U.S. law controlled the validity of the United States attachments
and their status as preferences. American Express Int'l Banking Corp. v. Johnson, [1984]
HKLR 372, 381-85.
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tages of a jurisdiction where transactions with insiders would
not be questioned. Their lenders might encourage them to do so,
hoping for maximum opportunities for self-help not subject to
retrospective avoidance. Although it is not likely that a company
would re-locate purely in anticipation of insolvency, watered-
down insolvency laws favoring powerful parties might be part of
a package of low-regulation laws offered by jurisdictions seeking
multinational headquarters. This problem is real and important
but merely part of a much larger difficulty in the regulation of
multinationals. It can be ameliorated in the United States by
sensitive application of the section 304 requirement that the
other country have roughly similar insolvency laws.
It is right to present candidly the difficulties with the home-
country rule I propose for jurisdictions embracing Modified Uni-
versalism, but I would not want those difficulties to overshadow
the fundamental virtues of the rule. No other approach will yield
the transparency, reciprocity, and predictability necessary for
international cooperation in insolvency matters. Although the
difficulties it creates are substantial, the obstacles created by
other approaches seem to me to be nearly insurmountable.
VI. CONCLUSION
In a world in which we have barely begun to address the
most basic aspects of bankruptcy cooperation internationally, it
may seem premature to begin discussion of a sophisticated prob-
lem like avoidance of transactions in transnational cases. Yet the
rather dramatic initiative taken by the United States in section
304 has already begun to generate cases requiring analysis of
that problem.
This Article takes only the most tentative and preliminary
first steps toward a general analysis, but it highlights three cen-
tral points that will demand consideration as the law evolves.
The first is that avoidance in transnational cases is ultimately a
choice of law problem intimately related to more general choice
of law issues in business cases, all of which re'st ultimately on a
vision of the appropriate regulation of multinational enterprise.
Here, as elsewhere, to fail to fashion a transnational system that
effectively regulates the conduct of multinational parties is to
drop the reins of the powerful, high-strung capitalist horse. The
point is especially acute in bankruptcy, because a multina-
tional's general default creates a single worldwide crisis for many
parties in many jurisdictions.
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The second point is that cross-border avoidance issues are
firmly linked in policy and consequence to related doctrines
which will determine the distribution of the proceeds of avoid-
ance. From that follows the third point, which is that the proper
choice of avoidance law depends heavily on the system of inter-
national cooperation (or refusal to cooperate) to which a given
national legal regime is committed.
I have failed to discuss many difficulties and possible varia-
tions because of their complexity. I have also deliberately fo-
cused on the larger policy questions, ignoring many details. I
have done so because of my conviction that we cannot make pro-
gress in management of multinational defaults unless we take
large steps.130 Those of us who have devoted many years to stud-
ying the marvelous intricacies of our own domestic insolvency
systems have to find the intellectual fortitude to step back from
those fascinating details so that we may help to fashion a worka-
ble system of international cooperation in insolvency matters
based on broadly understood notions of the common interest. If
we help to create such a system, our reward will be to make an
important contribution to the historic evolution now taking
place, the binding-together of a world of nation states by the
sturdy cables of commerce.
130. Westbrook, Global Insolvencies, supra note 8.
[Vol. XVII:3
